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DIALOGUE AND HIERARCHY IN CHARTER INTERPRETATION:
A COMMENT ON R. V. MILLS
JAMIE CAMERON*

I. INTRODUCTION

Following the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. O'Connor,' Parliament
enacted Bill C-46,2 which added ss. 278.1-278.9 to the Criminal Code.3 Not only does
the legislation complicate the labyrinth that governs the disclosure and production of
records to the accused in sex offence cases, it directly challenged Supreme Court of
Canada authority. Though Parliament did not rely on s. 33 of the Charter 4 to protect its
law from review, the Court upheld Bill C-46 in R. v. Mills,5 despite overt contradiction
between O'Connor and the government's additions to the Criminal Code. If it is unusual
for Parliament to legislate so boldly in the face of constitutional precedent, it is equally
remarkable that the Court so willingly participated in the emasculation of its authority to
interpret the Charter.
For years, the contest between the rights of the accused and those of the complainants
in sex offence cases has been a source of controversy under the Charter.6 One issue is
whether the accused is entitled to a complainant's counselling and therapeutic records,
which may be generated by third parties for treatment purposes unrelated to the
investigation of a crime. On that question, Bill C-46 made plain the legislature's intent
to subordinate the right to make full answer and defence to the privacy and equality rights
of victims, not to mention to law enforcement objectives.' Moreover, it is not as though
the statute diverged on minor points and technicalities; to the contrary, Parliament enacted
a scheme that differed in four fundamental respects from the principles and procedures

2

3

6

Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School. I have benefited greatly from comments on an earlier
draft by Professor David Paciocco, Mr. Peter Sankoff, and Professor Lome Sossin. I would also like
to thank Ms. Angela Green-lngham (Osgoode Hall LL.B., 2001), for providing research assistance
in the preparation of this comment.
[1995] 4 S.C.R. 411 [hereinafter O'Connor] (per Lamer C.J.C. and Sopinka J., for the majority, on
disclosure and production, and L'Heureux-Dubd J., for the majority, in denying a stay of
proceedings); see also A.(L.L) v. B.(A), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 536 (applying the procedures adopted in
O'Connor in a companion case).
An Act to amend the CriminalCode (Productionof records in sexual offence proceedings), 2d Sess.,
35th Parl., 1996 (assented to 25 April 1997, S.C. 1997, c. 30).
R.S.C. 1985, c. 46.
CanadianCharterof Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B
to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. II.
[1999] 3 S.CR. 668 [hereinafter Mills] (Lamer [then] C.J.C., dissenting in part).
See, e.g., R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577 (striking down the Criminal Code's "rape-shield"
provision); R. v. Osolin, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 595 (holding that the trial judge erred in failing to allow
cross-examination of the complainant on her medical records); and R. v. Carosella,[1997] 1 S.C.R.
80 (holding that a sexual assault centre's destruction of evidence violated the accused's right of full
answer and defence).
See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
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established by O'Connor.' In ignoring the Court's majority opinion, Bill C-46 favoured
the interests of complainants on virtually every issue it addressed.
Though a variety of its features were invalidated in the lower courts, the Supreme
Court upheld the legislation in Mills. Chief Justice Lamer, together with lacobucci and
Major JJ., abandoned their position in O'Connor,and though the Chief Justice registered
a dissent on Crown disclosure, Mr. Justice lacobucci co-authored the Court's opinion with
McLachlin J.(as she then was), who dissented in the earlier case and had by the time of
Mills been named Chief Justice-designate. L'Heureux-Dubd and Gonthier JJ., who had
also dissented in O'Connor,likewise voted to uphold Bill C-46. Meanwhile, the remaining
panel members in Mills, Justices Bastarache and Binnie, did not participate in O'Connor.9
In the circumstances, the riddle of Mills is that legislation which lookedunconstitutional
was not unconstitutional after all.' Considering that its members could not agree on
these issues prior to Bill C-46, it is curious that the Court so readily allowed Parliament
to legislate contrary to O'Connor's interpretation of the Charter. But rather than
acknowledge that it had changed its mind or invalidate Bill C-46, which might have
provoked yet another outcry about judicial review," Mills touted Parliament's response
as an exemplar of dialogue between institutions. Put another way, instead of conceding
that it had overruled O'Connor,the Court claimed it had merely demonstrated institutional
respect for Parliament.
This case comment does not join issue on the question of whether Bill C-46 and Mills
unacceptably compromise the rights of the accused or whether they unduly favour the
interests of complainants, but focuses on two issues of methodology: the first concerns
constitutional interpretation and the democratic process, or the dialogue issue; and the
second, the relationship between Charter guarantees, or the hierarchy issue. To set the
stage, an initial section provides an overview of the Stinchcombe 2/0'Connor/Mills
trilogy, and is followed by a more detailed analysis of Mills that examines the tension
between judicial and legislative decision making, before considering how Parliament and

0

12

Not only did Parliament extend Bill C-46's framework for defence access to counselling and
therapeutic records held by the Crown, it effectively implemented the dissent's procedural constraints,
by adopting a high threshold for likely relevance, a salutary benefits/deleterious consequences test
at stage one as well as stage two of the process, and a requirement that society's interests be
considered before access is granted. See infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
The panel in Mills comprised eight members of the Court, rather than nine, because Cory J. heard
argument but, having retired, took no part in the judgment.
See D. Paciocco, "Criminal Jurisprudence in the Supreme Court of Canada: IV. Recent Developments
in Criminal Procedure; A. Access to Third Party Records" (National Judicial Institute Appellate
Courts Seminar, Ottawa, April 2000) [unpublished]; R. Pomerance, "Shifting Ground: New
Approaches to Charter Analysis in Criminal Context" 8 Canada Watch 36; L. Pringle, "Defence
Under Attack: A Review of Three Important Supreme Court of Canada Decisions" 8 Canada Watch
31; P. Sankoff, "Crown Disclosure After Mills: Have the Ground Rules Suddenly Changed?" (2000)
28 C.R. (5th) 285; D. Stuart, "Mills: Dialogue with Parliament and Equality by Assertion at What
Cost?" (2000) 28 C.R. (5th) 275.
Mills was decided in the aftermath of R. v. Marshall, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456 (upholding aboriginal
fishing rights) and R. v. Marshall, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 533 (clarifying the Court's earlier decision and
confirming the federal government's authority to regulate aboriginal fishing).
R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326.
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the Court altered O'Connor's model for balancing the rights of the accused and
complainants. On the latter issue, though the article does not comment in detail on the
mechanics of defence access to these records, some attention to particulars is necessary
to show how the Court both eschewed and embraced a hierarchy among Charter
entitlements. 3 A final section returns to overriding questions of hierarchy. Beyond the
substantive issue of ranking rights and interpreting s. 7 is the question of relations
between institutions. There, Parliament's decision to negate O'Connor by ordinary
legislation calls into question any concept of dialogue as a demonstration of mutual
respect between courts and legislatures. In that regard, it is doubtful that dialogue's
objective of keeping the institutional peace augurs well for constitutional rights. As the
conclusion suggests, the concept is more likely to compromise entitlements and destabilize Charterjurisprudence.
II. DISCLOSURE AND PRODUCTION: THE STINCHCOMBE/
O'CoNNORIMILLs TRILOGY

In combination, Stinchcombe and O'Connor imposed significant burdens of disclosure
and production, respectively, on the Crown and on third parties.' 4 In Stinchcombe, for
instance, Sopinka J.described the arguments in favour of imposing a constitutional duty
of disclosure on the Crown as "overwhelming."' 5 Quoting Boucher v. The Queen, and
Rand J.'s statement that "none [is] charged with greater personal responsibility" than
Crown prosecutors,' 6 Sopinka J. held that the Crown must disclose all relevant
information as a matter of constitutional duty, unless non-disclosure is justified by the law
of privilege. 7 Subject to that exception, Stinchcombe established the rule that
"information ought not to be withheld if there is a reasonable possibility [of impairing]
the right of the accused to make full answer and defence."'"
Before long, the logic of Stinchcombe was challenged on two key points: whether
certain kinds of information are exempt from disclosure or production, and whether an
accused's right of full answer and defence can be enforced, not only against the Crown,
but against thirdparties as well. Requests for counselling and therapeutic records were
met by the response that treatment records potentially relating to the commission of sexual
assault offences should not be dealt with the same way as other documents; rather they

On the question of mechanics, see Paciocco, supra note 10 (explaining how Mills in effect read the
"constitutional mischief' out of Bill C-46 to achieve an acceptable balance between the interests at

stake).

"

15

16
17

"Disclosure" refers to the Crown's duty to share information with the accused and "production" to
any obligation that might be imposed on a third party, in fulfillment of an accused's right of full
answer and defence.
Stinchcombe, supra note 12 at 333.
[1955] S.C.R. 16 at 24.
Stinchcombe, supra note 12 at 333 (adding that "the fruits of the investigation which are [in the

Crown's possession] are not the property of the Crown for use in securing a conviction but the
property of the public to be used toensure that justice is done," and, at 340, that the absolute
Is

withholding of relevant information can only be justified on the basis of a legal privilege [i.e.,
narrowly defined] which excludes the information from disclosure.)
Ibid. at 340 (recognizing, however, that disclosure is subject to notions of relevance, as well as to
considerations relating to the timing and manner of disclosure).
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should be set apart and treated differently.' 9 Moreover, though the accused can enforce
Stinchcombe against the Crown, it was less clear that full answer and defence could be
claimed against those who are neither Crown prosecutors, nor agents of the state. Under
the Charter's logic of government action, the basis on which the accused could wrest
private records from third parties was far from apparent.2
From the accused's perspective, it is the existence of records that triggers an entitlement
under s. 7 of the Charter, whether the information is held by the Crown or by third
parties. 2 Meantime, a complainant's stake in the privacy of those records is just as
strong, and it matters little whether the documents are held by the Crown or by third
parties. The challenge for the Court in O'Connor was either to decide whose interest
should prevail, or to craft a compromise between the demands of absolute access and
absolute privilege.
Although the status of Crown-held records was not at issue in O'Connor, the Court
addressed the question anyway, and in doing so concluded that a balancing of interests
was "unnecessary in the context of disclosure." 22 As to the content of such records, Chief
Justice Lamer and Sopinka J. held that full answer and defence is "unaffected by the
confidential nature of therapeutic records,"23 because "there is simply no compelling
reason to depart from the reasoning in Stinchcombe."24 Under O'Connor, then,
documents which fall into the Crown's hands are subject to disclosure; in this regard far
from being equivocal, the joint opinion emphasized that "information in the possession
of the Crown which is clearly relevant and important to the ability of the accused to raise
a defence must be disclosed ... regardless of any potential claim of privilege that might
arise."25 With concurring votes from Cory, lacobucci and Major JJ., this aspect of
O'Connor constituted majority opinion.2 6 Meanwhile, L'Heureux-Dubd J. complained

19

20

SI

22
23
24
25

26

See, e.g., K. Kelly, "'You must be crazy if you think you were raped': Reflections on the Use of
Complainants' Personal and Therapy Records in Sexual Assault Trials" (1997) 9 C.J.W.L. 178
(arguing that such records are used to discredit witnesses and reflect a range of gender-biased social
myths under the guise of scientific fact or medical evidence); cited by Mills, supra note 3.
See, e.g., R. v. Carosella, supra note 6 at 117, per L'Heureux-Dubd J. in dissent, maintaining that

disclosure is a concept that is binding solely on the Crown, and not upon the public at large.
See L'Heureux-Dubd J. in O'Connor, supra note I at 479 (acknowledging that "when an accused
is unable to make full answer and defence ... as a result of his inability to obtain information that is
material to his defence, it is of little concern whether that information is in the hands of the state or
in the hands of a third party.")
Ibid. at 429.
Ibid.
Ibid. at 432 [emphasis added].

Ibid. at 431 [underlining in original and italics my emphasis]. The Court emphasized its conclusion
several times, indicating, at 429, that concerns relating to privacy or privilege disappear when
documents have fallen into the possession of the Crown; adding, at 430, that fairness requires that
if the complainant has released the information to advance the prosecution, then the accused should
be entitled to use it for defence purposes; and summarizing, at 431, that "any form of privilege may
be forced to yield where such a privilege would preclude the accused's right to make full answer and
defence."
Justices Cory and lacobucci concurred with the joint opinion on the issues relating to disclosure and
-production, and then joined L'Heureux-Dubd 1. in supporting a majority result denying a stay of
proceedings.
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that because the issue did not arise on the facts and was not argued by the parties, the
joint opinion's remarks about records in the Crown's possession were "strictly obiter.""
On the production of records, the majority in O'Connoreffectively acknowledged that
records held by third parties are different and accordingly not subject to the rigours of
Stinchcombe. Specifically, the Chief Justice and Sopinka J. found that the interests of the
accused and of the complainant should be balanced in the following way. To gain access
to third party records, the accused has the initial burden of demonstrating likely relevance.
That threshold enables a judge to decide whether records should be produced to the court,
and there the joint opinion made it clear that the standard is not onerous.28 Once that
burden is met, a second step requires that the judge decide whether the accused should
have access to the records. On that question, Lamer C.J.C. and Sopinka J. agreed
generally with L'Heureux-Dubd J. that the salutary benefits and deleterious effects of a
production order must be balanced.29 Even so, the joint opinion made it clear that the
question in every case is whether a "non-production order would constitute a reasonable
limit on the ability of the defence to make full answer and defence."30
Both in form and in substance, the joint opinion modified the more elaborate procedure
proposed by L'Heureux-Dubd J. Though the majority and minority share in common the
elements of a likely relevance threshold, and a balancing of interests to determine the
accused's access to records, the dissent rested on a different perception of the issues at
stake. For example, though L'Heureux-Dubd J. accepted the "fundamental" nature of full
answer and defence, she candidly declared that "[p]rivacy and equality must not be
sacrificed willy-nilly on the altar of trial fairness."'" She also complained about routine
insistence on exposure of the complainant's personal background, the *potential for a
"built-in bias" against victims, and the prospect that stereotype would triumph over logic
in the absence of a presumption against production.32 In her view, "arguments urging
production must rest upon permissible chains of reasoning, rather than upon discriminatory
assumptions and stereotypes." 33 Essentially, she maintained that fairness had been put on
a pedestal and that the evidentiary concept of relevance had been corrupted by myths and
stereotypes. Her proposal would correct those flaws by making it that much more difficult
for the defence to gain access to such records.
As a result, L'Heureux-Dubd J.'s test diverged from the majority's in three central
ways. First, after endorsing "likely relevance" she found that such evidence would rarely

2

28

29

Supra note I at 476; but see infra note 64 and accompanying text.
Ibid. at 436 (stating that the inquiry should be confined to the question of whether the right of full
answer and defence is "implicated" by information contained in the records) and at 437 adding that
"while this is asignificant burden, it should not be interpreted as an onerous burden ... and [the
onus]
should be a low one."
Ibid. at 441-42; note that L'Heureux-Dubd J. adapted that analysis from the majority opinion of
Lamer C.J.C. in Dagenaisv. C.B.C., [199413 S.C.R. 835 [hereinafter Dagenais](elaborating on the

kind of balancing that should be undertaken under the third part of s. I's proportionality test).
10

31
12
33

O'Connor,ibid. at 442.
Ibid. at 492 [emphasis added].
Ibid. at 487-90.
Ibid. at 492.
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4
be relevant and that the standard for production should therefore be strict. Second, she
required a salutary benefits/deleterious consequences analysis at stage one to determine
whether the records should be produced to the court. In other words, the judge cannot
view any documents without first concluding that full answer and defence outweighs
privacy and equality.3" From there L'Heureux-Dubd J.carried her determination to push
fairness from its altar into the second stage of the process and the ultimate question of
production to the accused. On that issue, she would require a fresh salutary benefitsdeleterious consequences analysis comprising seven factors, including two which address
law enforcement interests favourable to complainants.36

In enacting Bill C-46 seventeen months later, Parliament more or less adopted the
O'Connor dissent. First, though, against the majority's cleardirection, Bill C-46 extended
its procedures for defence access to records held by third parties to documents in the
Crown's possession." Then, in place of the majority's onus for likely relevance, the
legislation substituted an eleven-part definition of what is not considered prima facie
38
relevant to the stage one question of whether records should be produced to the court.
Next, Bill C-46 requires a judge to weigh the competing interests before ordering that
records be produced to the court, 39 and added criteria the O'Connor majority did not
consider imperative in the salutary benefits/deleterious consequences balancing of
interests.4°
When Mills arrived at the Supreme Court of Canada, Justices McLachlin and lacobucci
admitted that "there are several important respects in which Bill C-46 differs from the
regime set out in O'Connor."' 4 The joint opinion nonetheless maintained that "these
differences are'not fatal because Bill C-46 provides sufficient protection for all relevant
Charter rights."42 Before examining the institutional and substantive impact of the Mills
decision in detail, the extent of the Court's about-face should be noted. First, Mills upheld
s. 278.3(4)'s eleven grounds deemed insufficient on their own to establish likely
relevance, because "speculative myths, stereotypes, and generalized assumptions about
sexual assault victims and classes of records have too often in the past hindered the search

34

"

36

37
18
39
40

41

42

Ibid. at 497. Compare the joint opinion at 440 (stating that "[tihe sheer number of decisions in which
such evidence has been produced supports the potential relevance of therapeutic records") and at 441
(disagreeing that records will only be relevant in rare cases).
Ibid. at 501. Compare the joint opinion at 436 (stating that this balancing should be confined to the
second stage because ajudge will only be in an informed position to analyze the competing interests
when the records are available for review).
Ibid. at 504 (society's interest in encouraging the reporting of sexual offences and treatment for
victims, and the effect of production on the integrity of the trial process). Compare the joint opinion
at 442 (expressing reservations as to those criteria).
See s. 278.2(2) (stating that the provisions apply to a record in the possession or control of any
person, including the prosecutor).
See s. 278.3(4)(a)-(k).
Section 278.5(2)(a)-(h).
Section 278.5(2)() (requiring consideration of society's interest in encouraging the reporting of
sexual offences), and (g) (also requiring consideration of society's interest in encouraging the
obtaining of treatment by complainants of sexual offences).
Mills, supra note 5 at 690 [emphasis added].
Ibid.
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for truth."43 As for the Bill's checklist of eight factors to govern on production to the
court, the joint opinion explained that "[tjhe fact that the approach set out in s. 278.5 does
not accord with O'Connor's pronouncement ...
does not render it unconstitutional,"
because "this process is a "notable example of the dialogue between the judicial and
legislative branches."" Though the rule in O'Connor was "of course informed by the
Charter" the judges said it should not be read as a "rigid constitutional template.""a Thus
they held that, "[w]hile this Court may have considered it preferable not to consider [a
complainant's] privacy rights at the production stage, that does not preclude Parliament
from coming to a different conclusion, so long as its conclusion is consistent with the
Charter in its own right."46 As to the second stage of the process, the joint opinion
responded to the argument that Bill C-46 created a statutory bias by codifying two factors
that are societal rather than case-specific, with the remark that those items do
not have
4
controlling or conclusive weight, but are simply "to be taken into account.
The text of the Charter does not direct how conflicts between complainants and the
accused should be resolved. In the absence of guidance, methodology provides an
important guarantee against ad hoc decision making. With that in mind, the next two
sections address the institutional and substantive principles the Court relied on to uphold
Bill C-46.
I1.

MILLS AND INSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE BETWEEN
PARLIAMENT AND THE COURT

Though it seemed that the Court's choices were either to strike parts of Bill C-46 or
to overrule parts of O'Connor, the joint opinion avoided both extremes. By discounting
the "common law" status of Charter interpretation and praising the democratic process,
Mills downplayed the reality that the Court had overruled O'Connor, and in so doing
promoted the impression that the institutions are engaged in a co-operative enterprise. This
spirit of co-operation is referred to as dialogue, and is attractive to courts and legislatures
alike because it casts each in a favourable light.4 Thus, when Parliament overturns
precedent by ordinary legislation, characterizing the response as dialogue legitimizes a
form of institutional confrontation that should be channeled through s. 33's mechanism
for overriding the Charter. From the other side, dialogue takes the threat out of judicial
review by suggesting that courts can strike down legislation, as long as the legislatures are

4

44
45
46
4

48

Ibid. at 741. But see Paciocco, supra note 10 (explaining how Mills interpreted the "constitutional

mischief' out of this provision, thereby rendering its list of factors meaningless). See also infra note
113 and accompanying text.
Mills, supra note 5 at 748-49 and 745.

Ibid.
Ibid. at 749 [emphasis added].
Ibid. at 751. See supra note 40.

Dialogue as an answer to the claim that judicial review is illegitimate is primarily associated with P.
Hogg & A. Bushell, "The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps the
Charter of Rights Isn't Such A Bad Thing After All)" (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall L. 75.
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not pre-empted from re-drafting their laws. On that view, the essence of dialogue is that
Charter interpretation leaves room for a legislative response. 9
Though it is beyond the scope of this article to comment in detail on the concept, there
can be little doubt that O'Connor made it awkward for the Court to accept Bill C-46 as
a true instance of dialogue. As noted above, Parliament defied the Court's majority
opinion in at least four principal respects. Even so, Mills avoided a result antithetical to
the co-operative spirit of dialogue by a theory of institutional relations which rested, in
part, on the "common law" status of Charter interpretation. Focusing on the judge-made
quality of the O'Connordoctrine enabled Justices McLachlin and lacobucci to declare that
the question in Mills was not whether Parliament could amend the common law, as "it
clearly can." 5 Hence they concluded, "[w]e cannot presume that the legislation is
unconstitutional simply because it is different from the common law position."'" Having
conceded the point, the joint opinion pronounced that the key in Mills was whether
Parliament had chosen a "constitutionally acceptable procedure. '5 2 On that, the Justices
stated that the range of permissible regimes is "not confined to the specific rule adopted
by the Court pursuant to its competence in the common law,""s because "[s]uch a
'
In their view, it
situation could only undermine rather than enhance democracy."54
the only possible
as
establishing
followed that "[i]f the common law were to be taken
the
legislature." 5
with
of
a
dialogue
constitutional regime, then we could not speak
Accordingly, it was "perfectly reasonable" that Parliament's concerns led to a procedure
that is "different from the common law position but that nonetheless meets the required
constitutional standards."56
In stating that "[t]he law develops through dialogue between courts and legislatures"
and adding that "O'Connor is not necessarily the last word" on defence access to third
party records," Mills took deference to new heights. That much is undeniable in the
pronouncement that the fact a law passed by Parliament "differs from a regime envisaged
by the Court" does not mean that the statute is unconstitutional.5 Circular reasoning
produced a number of statements along similar lines, including the suggestion that the
government can "build on the Court's decision, and develop a different scheme as long
as it remains constitutional."5 9 By that logic, "Parliament was free to craft its own
solution to the problem consistent with the Charter."6 The assumption in Mills, that
Parliament is free to dispense with precedent, may have reached its pinnacle in the
statement that "[t]o insist on slavish conformity [to the Court's rulings] would belie the

50

51
52
53
54
55
56
57

58
59

(10

See, e.g., Hogg & Bushell, ibid., arguing that the effect of the Charter is rarely to block a legislative
objective, but mainly to influence the design of implementing legislation.
Supra note 5 at 713.
Ibid. [emphasis added].
Ibid.
Ibid. at 712.
Ibid at 711 [emphasis added].
Ibid. [emphasis added].
Ibid. at 713.
Ibid. at 689.
Ibid. at 710.
Ibid. [emphasis added].
Ibid. at 689 [emphasis added].
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mutual respect that underpins the relationship between the courts and legislature."'" With
the Supreme Court of Canada granting the government a license to ignore its
interpretations of the Charter, it is difficult to see how this symmetry of respect actually
works.
In specific terms, though O'Connor bifurcated the Crown and third parties and attached
different obligations to each, Bill C-46 treated the two in the same way. To sustain this
aspect of the Bill, Mills essentially abandoned Stinchcombe's principle that the Crown has
a general duty to disclose. At the same time, O'Connor was dispensed with by judicial
sleight of hand, which rejected the argument that s. 278.2 contradicts Stinchcombe and
O'Connor as "an overstatement of the Crown obligation to disclose that was affirmed in
those cases."62 After repeating that "[tihe mere fact that this procedure differs from that
set out in Stinchcombe does not, without more establish a constitutional violation," Mills
accepted that Bill C-46 "puts the Crown at an advantage," but found no violation of ss.
63
7 or I1(d) of the Charter.
It is true that the remarks in O'Connorabout Crown-held records were obiter and that
the majority can be criticized for deciding questions of law that were not raised by the
record or argued by the parties.64 Instead, the joint opinion in Mills maintained that there
is no inconsistency between Stinchcombe's and O'Connor's duties of disclosure and the
fetters Bill C-46 places on defence access to records held by the Crown. 65 Prior to
Mills,

though, it was widely accepted that the obligation did not change with the content of the
records, 66 and that O'Connor was not in any way predicated upon the fact that a waiver
by the complainant had been made.67 Respectfully, then, if it is an overstatement that
Stinchcombe and O'Connor resolved all issues relating to third party records, it is equally

61
62

63

64

65

,

67

Ibid. at 710 [emphasis added].
Ibid. at 733. Justices McLachlin and lacobucci maintained that Stinchcombe should be distinguished
because privacy was not at stake, and rejected the suggestion in O'Connor that a reasonable
expectation of privacy is lost once the Crown comes into possession of records, indicating
that
privacy cannot be forfeited in the absence of an express waiver.
Ibid. at 735 and 736 (emphasis added].
See supra note 26. Even so, the Court has addressed issues that are not properly
before it, before and
after O'Connor, with little suggestion that the precedent is lacking in authority as a result.
For a
sampling, see Reference re Remuneration ofJudges of the ProvincialCourt ofPrince Edward
Island,
[1997] 3 S.CR. 3 (expanding and then deciding issues that were not before the Court, over
La Forest
J.'s dissent); Libman v. Quebec, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 569 (overruling the Alberta Court of
Appeal in
Somerville v. Canada(1996), 136 D.L.R. (4th) 205, though the decision was not appealed
and the
record was not before the Supreme Court); Reference re Secession of Quebec, [199812 S.CR.
217
(basing the Court's decision on a duty to negotiate that was not raised or briefed by
any of the
parties); and R. v. Stone, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 290 (altering the law relating to automatism on
issues that
were neither raised nor briefed by the parties).
The Chief Justice agreed that Parliament could legislate in this area but dissented because
the
statutory scheme tipped the scales too far in favour of privacy: Mills, supra note 5 at 685.
See Sankoff, supra note 10 at 287 (stating that "[u]ntil the release of Mills, it had been
almost
unanimously accepted by lower courts and legal observers alike that the O'Connor majority
meant
exactly what it said: otherwise private records which are in the hands of the Crown
must be
disclosed." [footnote omitted]).
Ibid. at 289. Sankoff states that "the swift rejection of O'Connor on this point is unsettling
...
[but]
the treatment of Stinchcombe was even more remarkable."
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6
an overstatement to declare that Parliament had merely filled a void. ' Far from filling
a gap, Bill C-46 displaced a careful framework for balancing rights that had been
deliberated upon and adopted by a majority of the Court in O'Connor.

As for third parties, Mills permitted Parliament to reverse O'Connor's "common law"
interpretations of the Charter on likely relevance, on balancing at stage one of the process,
and on the factors that influence the balancing of interests, because the legislative result
met the "required constitutional standards." The problem is that when Parliament's
legislation is incompatible with, or is in conflict with constitutional precedent, it cannot
meet those standards until the Court abandons existing precedent or changes its
interpretation of the Constitution. In weak defence of its authority, the joint opinion stated
that "[w]hile this dialogue is obviously of a somewhat different nature when the common
law rule involves interpretation of the Charter, as in O'Connor, it remains a dialogue
nonetheless."69 Along the same lines, Justices McLachlin and lacobucci added
standards,
ambiguously that, "[wihile it is the role of the courts to specify [constitutional]
7°
there may be a range of permissible regimes that can meet these standards." In making
that remark, the joint opinion simultaneously acknowledged the status of constitutional
interpretation and surrendered the Court's authority to Parliament's will. On the basis of
Mills, it is difficult to see how Charter interpretation can be principled when the power
to decide important questions ricochets between institutions engaged in some ad hoc form
of dialogue.
Moreover, without stating exactly why it should carry so much weight, the Court
attached significant value to the consultation process that culminated in Bill C-46.
Effectively, Mills claimed that a process which listens to the voices of the vulnerable and
enacts well-intentioned legislation to protect their interests can supplant precedent. For
instance, Justices McLachlin and lacobucci declaredthat "[clourts do not hold a monopoly
on the protection and promotion of rights and freedoms," and added that "[tlhis is
especially important to recognize in the context of sexual violence."'" In making that
statement, Mills came close to conceding that Parliament does a better job of protecting
the vulnerable, and thereby calling into question the Court's mandate to enforce
constitutional rights.
Explaining the statute's alterations to O'Connor, the joint opinion declared that
"Parliament must be taken to have determined, as a result of lengthy consultations, and
years of Parliamentary study and debate, that trial judges have sufficient evidence [to
72
balance the rights of the two parties at stage one]." Then, after conceding that "little
statistical data existed at the time of drafting Bill C-46 on the application of O'Connor,"
the Justices declared that "it was open to Parliamentto give what weight it saw fit to the
'3
evidence presentedat the consultations." Once again McLachlin and lacobucci JJ. re-

68
69

70
71
72
73

Mills, supra note 5 at 735.
Ibid. at 711 [emphasis added].

Ibid. at 712.
Ibid.
Ibid. at 744 [emphasis added].
Ibid. at 745 [emphasis added].
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iterated that "the mere fact that Bill C-46 does not mirror O'Connor does not render it
unconstitutional. 74 They found, instead, that "[flrom the information available to
Parliament and the submissions it received during the consultation process, Parliament
concluded that the effect of production on the integrity of the trial" should be taken into
account at both stages of the application for production.75
The Court's reliance on consultation is problematic for two reasons. First, as to Bill C46, the joint opinion lauded the process but nowhere described it in detail, and nowhere
expressed concern or interest whether the interests of the accused had been heard. Instead,
as this excerpt from Mills reveals, the process was aimed in one direction:
Parliament ...
is often able to act as a significant ally for vulnerable groups. This is especially important
to recognize in the context of sexual violence.... If constitutional democracy is meant to ensure that due
regard is given to the voices of those vulnerable to being overlooked by the majority, then this court has
an obligation to consider respectfully Parliament's attempt to respond to such voices.
...
[InBill C-46] Parliament also sought to recognize the prevalence of sexual violence against women
and children and its disadvantageous impact on their rights, to encourage the reporting of incidents of
sexual violence, to recognize the impact of the production of personal information on the efficacy of
treatment, and to reconcile fairness to complainants with the rights of the accused....
Parliament may also be understood to be recognizing 'horizontal' equality concerns, where women's
inequality results from the acts of other individuals and groups rather than the state, but which
nonetheless may have many consequences for the criminal justice system."'

Though the Court maintained that the victims of sexual offences are vulnerable to being
overlooked by the majority, in the circumstances of a consultation process that was slanted
one way, it is those accused of sexual offences who appear more at risk of being
overlooked."
Second, the logic of consultation is suspect, as the constitutionality of legislation should
neither be defined nor determined by process criteria. Consultation per se should not be
considered particularly strong evidence either that a breach of the Charter never occurred
or that if it did, that the violation is justified. The fact of "consultation" provides no
guarantee that the process was balanced or representative; and to assume otherwise is
naYve. If a flawed process can sometimes invalidate a law that is constitutional in

74
73
76

77

Ibid. [emphasis added].
Ibid. at 754.
Ibid. at 712-13 [emphasis added].
Of the fourteen witnesses who appeared before the Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs
between March 14 and April 9, 1997, nine were advocates for the victims of sexual violence, two
represented the interests of the accused, and the rest were government witnesses, who presumably
supported the legislation; see online: Parliamentary lnternet<http://www.parl.gc.ca/english/ebus.html>
(last modified: 25 September 1997).
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substance, it does not follow that consultation should save a law that is invalid on its
face.7" To rhapsodize democracy in the name of dialogue is to forget some of history's
sorriest moments, and though an absence of consultation may exacerbate a breach of the
Charter, its presence cannot save a violation that is, in substantive terms,
unconstitutional. 79
The second aspect of democratic process that the joint opinion in Mills referred to with
approval was Bill C-46's preamble. Here, too, concerns can be voiced about the Court's
reliance on this aspect of the legislation. 0 First, as noted, the preamble demonstrates
beyond peradventure that Bill C-46 was concerned with the rights of complainants and
with law enforcement objectives, and though it includes passing reference to the rights of
the accused, there is no mistaking the thrust of this legislation.8 ' More generally, though
a preamble can offer guidance as to a statute's objectives, its purpose is self-serving and,
as a result, its imprecatory words should not be taken at face value. Doing so is
unprincipled because it treats rhetoric as a substitute for the Charter's requirement that
limits on rights be justified. Bill C-46's preamble may bespeak Parliament's "good
intentions," 82 but whether legislation is well-intentioned is not the test of its
constitutionality. In the circumstances, the joint opinion's statement that "courts must
presume that Parliament intended to enact constitutional legislation and strive, where
possible, to give effect to this intention," signalled that Justices McLachlin and Iacobucci
agreed with Bill C-46 and did not propose to engage in a critical review of its merits.8 3
Far from creating stability, Mills has thrown the status of Charter interpretation into
doubt, because it is now unclear which of the Court's decisions can be amended by
ordinary legislation, and which are "supreme." As for dialogue, either the Constitution is
supreme or it is not.84 If it is supreme, Parliament could only overrule O'Connor,

78

79

80
81
92
83

84

Without citing the article, Mills reflects the argument made by Martha Jackman in "Protecting Rights
and Promoting Democracy: Judicial Review Under Section I of the Charter"(1996) 34 Osgoode Hall
L.J. 661, that the democratic quality of government decisions, including the presence or absence of
consultation, should be a factor in Charter analysis.
A distinction should be drawn between a process that generates evidence to meet s. I's requirement
of being demonstrably justified, and a process that limits the rights of those who lack political power,
either to implement majoritarian concerns, such as law enforcement, or to satisfy those who have
special access to the system, like advocacy groups. For a brief account of a flawed process, see B.
Blugerman, "The New Child Pornography Law: Difficultieg of Bill C-128" (1993-95), 4 M.C.L.R.
17 at 25 (discussing the genesis of Canada's child pornography law).
Mills, supra note 5 at 708 and 712-13 (summarizing, extensively, from the preamble).
Ibid. at 708 (stating that "[t]he preamble expressly declares that Parliament seeks to provide a
framework of laws that are fair to and protect the rights of both accused persons and complainants.")
Ibid. at 730.
Ibid. at 711. Throughout, the joint opinion cited Slaight Communications v. Davidson, [1989] 1
S.C.R. 1038 [hereinafter Slaight], for the proposition that the court must strive to interpret legislation
consistently with the Charter. Yet Slaight dealt with the constitutionality of a discretion exercised
under statutory authority and does not provide strong support for that proposition. See Stuart, supra
note 10 at 276.
See Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch (5 U.S.) 137 (per U.S. Chief Justice John Marshall); see also
Dickerson v. United States, 2000 WL 807223 ( holding that the United States Congress may not
legislatively supersede U.S. Supreme Court decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution, and
concluding that a legislative provision inconsistent with the judge-made Miranda rule is
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legislatively, by invoking s. 33. On that view, the Court's choices in Mills were to
overrule O'Connor or to strike down parts of the legislation. 5 Alternatively, if
constitutional interpretation is not supreme, then s. 33 serves little purpose because the
Court's interpretations of the Charter are collapsed into the political process. In plain
terms, then, dialogue is flawed by its inherent and unavoidable malleability: that the Court
has invoked the concept both in deference to Parliament, as per Mills, and to defend
decisions striking down legislation, as per Vriend, corroborates the point.8 6 When
dialogue is invoked to support activism in one case and its opposite in another, it is
difficult to conclude that principles matter to the Court. Decisions appear instead to follow
a political barometerwhich tells the judges either that the legislature has been progressive
and that its law should be upheld, or that the legislature has acted regressively, in which
case the Chartercan be enforced. Though the institutions may be placated, the concept
of constitutional rights is certain to be compromised.
IV.

HIERARCHY IN CHARTER INTERPRETATION

While narrowing O'Connor to the point of abandoning it as precedent, Justices
McLachlin and lacobucci cited Dagenaisfor the proposition that "[n]o single principle is
absolute and capable of trumping the others."8" The problem with Dagenais is the
disparity between what in theory may appear sound and what is the reality of Charter
adjudication. Yet its spirit of egalitarianism was conveniently revived in the context of
defence access to records because it provided a rationale for enhancing the rights of
complainants vis-6-vis the accused. Although dissenting in Dagenais, L'Heureux-Dub6 J.
adopted its central proposition that a hierarchical approach to rights must be avoided. Thus
in O'Connor she declared that "[a]s important as the right to full answer and defence may
be, it must co-exist with other constitutional rights, rather than trample them." 9 To
remedy a status quo which, in her perception, had sacrificed privacy and equality "willynilly on the altar of trialfairness," she proposed the two step test that became the model
for Bill C-46.09
On first impression, an analogy between the fair trial issues in Dagenaisand O'Connor
and Mills might appear sound. In Dagenais, after commenting that "[a] hierarchical

unconstitutional).
85

6

87

88

89

As Hogg and Bushell note, supra note 48, it is not an either/or choice in those cases where a statute
fails the proportionality test, because a legislature can re-enact its statute in compliance with the
Court's interpretation of the Charter.
See Vriend v. Alberta, [1998]1 S.C.R. 493 (invoking dialogue to explain why provincial legislation
should be invalidated under the Charter), and M v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3 (invalidating provincial
legislation despite a free vote among elected lawmakers to decide the status of same-sex rights).
Mills, supra note 5 at 713.
Not long after Dagenais stated that the Charter's guarantees are co-equal, expressive freedom was
seconded to the protection of reputation in Hill v. Church of Scientology, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130
(refusing to modify the common law of libel in light of s. 2(b)), and again in R. v. Lucas, [1998] I
S.C.R. 439 (upholding the Criminal Code's defamatory libel provision). Reputation prevailed in both
instances, despite the fact that expressive freedom is explicitly protected by the Charter and
reputation is nowhere mentioned in the text.
O'Connor, supra note I at 491 [emphasis added].
Ibid. at 492 [emphasis added].
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must be avoided," the Court stated the obvious, that ss. 2(b) and
approach to rights ...
11(d) have equal status under the text of the Charter." As a result, it became necessary
to re-formulate the common law rule, which "automatically favoured" fair trial over
freedom of the press, and bring it into compliance with the Charter. Likewise, it can be
argued that Bill C-46 simply adjusts the balance between the accused and complainants.
Moreover, in both instances the Court held that the right to a fair trial must prevail when
the competing interests cannot be accommodated.92 Even so, though Dagenais required
both guarantees to be protected to the point when expressive freedom would compromise
fair trial, Bill C-46 chose one set of interests over another. 93 As well, the "nonhierarchical" balancing of rights in Dagenais took place under s. I but in Mills was
conducted under s. 7, with attendant implications for the scope of fundamental justice.
Still, the consequences for full answer and defence may not be cataclysmic. If the
Criminal Code's procedures entangle and obfuscate basic questions of relevance and
credibility, the trial process can be trusted not to compromise the rights of complainants
or of the accused.94 Of more immediate concern in this paper, therefore, are the Court's
comments on the relationship between s. 7 and other Charter guarantees, including s. 1.
For example, the joint opinion's conclusion that privacy and equality act as qualifiers on
s. 7 places the guarantee at risk of being read down in order not to conflict with other
parts of the Charter; in effect, it is as though Mills read the rest of the Charter into s. 7
to narrow its scope.95 In addressing the question of relationships between guarantees,
Justices McLachlin and Iacobucci relied on "context," emphasizing that s. 7 "embraces
more than the rights of the accused,"96 with the result that the right to make full answer
and defence is [not] "automatically breached" when relevant information is withheld.97
Having established that the accused's rights must be "defined in a context that includes
other principles of fundamental justice and Charter provisions," the Court cautioned that
the importance of privacy concerns should not be understated.9" After praising the
"eloquent submissions of many interveners" speaking on behalf of complainants,99
Justices McLachlin and lacobucci concluded that "the accused will have no right to the
records in question insofar as they contain information that is either irrelevant or would
serve to distort the search for truth, as access to such information is not included within
the ambit of the accused's right."' 00
The relationship between ss. 7 and 15 is defined by similar principles, with the
exception that equality emerges in Mills as the Charter's supreme aspiration. At the

91
92

93
94

95
9,
97
9

Supra note 29 at 877.
Dagenais, ibid. at 878-81 and Mills, supra note 5 at 751.

Access to records cannot be granted under the legislation until a high threshold for full answer and
defence has been crossed: Mills, ibid. at 729.
See Paciocco, supra note 10 at 115 (concluding that Bill C-46 achieved an acceptable balance
between interests in which information needed for full answer and defence will be furnished if the
test is applied properly, as interpreted by the Court in Mills).
But see infra note 109 and accompanying text.
Mills, supra note 5 at 718.
Ibid. at 719-20.
Ibid. at 720.

Ibid. at 723; for further approving references to interveners see ibid. at 726.
100 Ibid. at 726 [emphasis added].
9
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outset, the joint opinion declared that neither full answer and defence nor privacy may be
defined in a way that negates the other and that "both sets of rights are informed by the
equality rights at play in this context."'01 In light of this, Justices McLachlin and
lacobucci stated that "an appreciation of myths and stereotypes in the context of sexual
violence is essential to delineate properly the boundaries of full answer and defence," and
concluded that the accused is not entitled to information "that would only distort the truthseeking goal of the trial process."' 2 These remarks led the Justices to declare that
concerns for the circumstances of complainants "highlight the need for an acutesensitivity
to context when determining the content of the accused's right to make full answer and
defence."' 3 Accordingly, the joint opinion concluded that this right is not engaged
"where the accused seeks information that will only serve to distort the truth-seeking
purpose of a trial, and in such a situation, privacy and equality rights are paramount."' 4
Such an assertion of hierarchy among Charter rights could hardly be more explicit. A
further observation is that, although privacy might be considered a principle of
fundamental justice, due to the relationship between s. 7 and the other fundamental rights,
the same cannot be said of s. 15, which is essentially an intruder into s. 7.
The Supreme Court's insistence that it had simply defined s. 7 to avoid conflicts
between competing entitlements understates the shift in substantive entitlements that
occurred in Mills. As for s. 7, the decision created a double constitutional onus, or a
reverse constitutional onus: not only does the accused have to establish the entitlement
under s. 7, he or she has in addition to establish that it is justifiable for that entitlement
to prevail over any other Charterguarantees with which it may be in competition. Here
it is interesting to compare ss. 7 and 2(b). In R. v. Keegstra, the Court held that s. 15
could not be read into s. 2(b) to narrow the scope of expressive freedom, because conflicts
between rights should be resolved under s. 1."°' Dagenais, a key precedent in Mills,
came to the same conclusion. To the contrary, however, the joint opinion held in Mills
that the interests at stake should be resolved within s. 7.
Unfortunately, that interpretation renders s. I a virtual irrelevance. To explain the
functions of ss. 7 and 1, the joint opinion in Mills relied on the Motor Vehicle Reference
and its distinction between the basic tenets of the legal system, which are s. 7's terrain,
and democratic values, which fall under s. l's mandate." 6 When balancing the

01
1o2

Ibid. at 688 [emphasis added].
Ibid. at 727 [emphasis added]. To understand the Court's concern in this regard, see ibid. at 720, 726,
728, 729, 741 and 754; see also the Court's warning that "(tihe accused is not permitted to 'whack

1
104

105

the complainant' through the use of stereotypes regarding the victims of sexual assault": ibid. at 727.
Ibid. at 728 [emphasis added].

Ibid. at 729 [emphasis added]. The Court operated on an assumption that defence access is a
distortion, whether records are relevant or irrelevant. Accepting the subjectivity of relevance, to place
privacy and equality above relevance in the search for truth seems, at the very least, to depart from
prior conceptions of the concept's importance.
[1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (per Dickson C.J. for the majority and McLachlin J, in dissent). See also C.B.C.
v. Lessard, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 421 at 448 (per McLachlin J., in dissent, concluding that a search

warrant that violates s.2(b) must be justified under s. I and not blended into the s.8 analysis as to
106

whether a search is reasonable).
Supra note 5 at 716; see Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 [hereinafter Motor Vehicle
Reference].
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competing rights under s. 7, the Court upheld Bill C-46 in deference to democratic policy
making. Yet if respect for Parliament is the basis of Mills, by the joint opinion's own
reasoning, that conclusion should have been reached under s. I. Conflicts between the
accused's s. 7 rights and the complainant's rights under ss. 8 and 15 should be resolved
under s. 1, because that is where democratic values are weighed against rights. In Mills
the Court tried to have it both ways: to rely on the Motor Vehicle Reference to resolve
conflicts between rights by reading down s. 7, and then uphold Bill C-46 without a s. I
analysis.
Far from providing clarification, Mills has deepened the confusion which reigns at
present regarding basic questions about the relationship between Charter guarantees. For
example, though societal interests are sometimes balanced within s. 7, at other times that
function is performed by s. 1.1 °7 To take another example, after concluding that
economic entitlements are not recognized by s. 7 in one case, and rejecting parental
autonomy in another, Chief Justice Lamer imposed an affirmative obligation on the
government to provide legal aid in child custody proceedings.0 8 In that same case,
L'Heureux-Dubd J. held, in a concurring opinion, that equality considerations can expand
s. 7, a statement that is the diametric opposite of Mills, which also relied on s. 15 but to
contract the scope of fundamental justice." 9 As a result, the proposition that s. 7's
definition of fundamental justice is conditioned by s. 15 is now entrenched in majority
opinion, for better or for worse.
The Court's conception of equality is equally muddled. After years of irresolution, it
finally agreed on a test for breach under s. 15; however, the paradox there is that a
standard that is aimed at maximizing the Charter'sprotection of equality is so complex
and intractable as to defeat most claims."' Strangely, though, while claims raised under
s. 15 must run a gamut of doctrinal criteria simply to establish aprimafacie infringement
requiring justification under s. 1, a more relaxed notion of equality can qualify s. 7 and
dilute s. 2(b)'s protection under s. I, without having to meet s. 15's definitional
standard."' The anomaly is that outside s. 15, an ad hoc concept of equality is at work
that is not based on doctrine but rooted, instead, in instinct and perception. Finally, as
previously mentioned, there remains the contradiction in the way that equality affects
other Charterguarantees: when it is in conflict with s. 2(b) the issue is resolved under s.
1, but in the case of s. 7, it conditions the definition of fundamental justice.

See Pomerance, supra note 10 (briefly discussing the relationship between ss. 7 and i) at 36-38.
IN8 Compare New Brunswick (Minister of Health) v. G.(J.), [199913 S.C.R. 46, and Reference
re ss. 193
and 195.1 of the CriminalCode, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123 at 1163-66 (concurring opinion excluding
economic interests from s. 7; and B.(R.) v. Children'sAid Society, [1995] I S.C.R. 315 (proposing
a narrow interpretation ofs. 7).
109
Ibid. at 100-101 (stating that s. 7 must be interpreted to take the principles and purposes
of the
equality guarantee into account).
1o
Law v. Canada, [19991 1 S.C.R. 497 [hereinafter Law]. Not only is it less
certain how an elaborate
test like that in Law will be applied, it is more difficult to establish a breach under its multi-layered
definition of equality. See C. Bredt & I. Nishisato, "The Supreme Court's New Quality Test: A
Critique'" 8 Canada Watch 16.
For a critique of this aspect of Mills, see Stuart, supra note 10 at 279-82.
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These confusions, contradictions, and ambiguities are exasperating for those who
struggle with the inconsistencies of Charter jurisprudence. As well, a final comment on
Mills is that the Court should be cautious not to overstate the prevalence of myths,
stereotypes, and discrimination in the criminal justice system, as though their existence
is unarguable. The joint opinion's documentation of this pattern is thin in Mills, with little
attention being dedicated to the nature of these myths, where they are found, or how they
might be remedied at minimal cost to a fair trial and to the rights of the accused. Yet
whatever was once true of trials for sexual offences, the problems have been identified
and remedied, if imperfectly, in recent years." 2 For the future, the Court must be wary
of uncritically accepting the orthodoxy or dogma that these biases persist systemically
throughout the system. It cannot be forgotten that assumptions that are not well-founded
are an injustice, no matter whom they benefit or disadvantage. If the system treated
complainants poorly in the past, that is no reason to place a history of discrimination and
bias on an altar that risks creating new forms of injustice."'
V.

CONCLUSION

R. v. Mills is a troubling decision, not simply because the rights of complainants were
enhanced at the expense of those of the accused, but more importantly, because of the way
the Supreme Court of Canada addressed issues of principle and methodology. The joint
opinion's attempt to explain why it was permissible for Parliament to overturn an
authoritative interpretation of the Charter is not persuasive on any of the grounds
suggested: that O'Connor is a "common law" decision that can be repealed by ordinary
legislation; that Bill C-46 can essentially overturn O'Connor because the courts and
legislatures are engaged in a dialogue; that O'Connor could be sufficiently read down to
minimize the contradiction between Supreme Court of Canada precedent and Parliament's
response. As for dialogue, the concept is dangerous, in the first instance, because it invites
Parliament to override Supreme Court of Canada authority by ordinary legislation and
thereby avoid paying the institutional price of relying on s. 33.' 4 It is dangerous for a
second reason, because dialogue not only deflects criticism of the judiciary but
simultaneously serves the purposes of activism and restraint; as such, it is inherently

112

11.

11

But see R. v. Ewanchuk, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330 at 372-75 (per L'Heureux-Dubd J., concurring,
chastizing McClung J.A. of the Alberta Court of Appeal for inappropriately characterizing the
complainant's appearance and behaviour).
See D. Paciocco, "Techniques for Eviscerating the Concept of Relevance: A Reply and Rejoinder to
'Sex with the Accused on Other Occasions': The Evisceration of Rape Shield Protection" (1995), 33
C.R. (4th) 365 at 379 (cautioning against the declaration of myth as a justification for excluding
evidence).
For other examples see s. 33.1 of the Criminal Code, enacted by Bill C-72, An Act to amend the
Criminal Code (Self-induced intoxication), Ist Sess., 35th ParI., 1995 (assented to 13 July 1995, S.C.
1995, c. 32), following R. v. Daviault, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 63; ss. 326-28 of the Canada Elections Act,
enacted by Bill C-2, An Act respecting the election of members to the House of Commons, 2d Sess.,
36th ParI., 1999 (assented to 31 May 2000, S.C. 2000, c. 9), introducing a modification of the
opinion poll blackout invalidated in Thomson Newspapers v. Canada, [1998] I S.C.R. 877. But see
Bill 5, An Act to amend certain statutes because of the Supreme Court of Canada decision in M v.
H., 1st Sess., 37th Parl., Ontario, 1999 (assented to 28 October 1999, S.O. 1999, c. 6) (reluctantly
amending a host of statutes to comply with the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in M v. H.,
[1999] 2 S.C.R. 3).
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malleable. By upsetting the Charter'sprinciple of hierarchy - that constitutional rights
are supreme, unless and until s. 33 is invoked - Mills will have a de-stabilizing effect
on precedent and the protection of rights.
On the substantive side, the Court's interpretation of s. 7 is problematic for two
reasons, in the main. First, by reading privacy and equality into s. 7 to cut down the scope
of fundamental justice, the Court in Mills compromised s. 7's status as an equal of the
Charter's other rights. As a result, s. 7 is not equal, but less than equal. Second, the lack
of constancy in the jurisprudence has made it all but impossible to identify the principles
and rationales underlying s. 7. Far from providing clarification, Mills demonstrates that
the Court's concept of fundamental justice is as shifting and as unpredictable as ever.

